In charging Boston police officer with manslaughter, Suffolk DA ignored broader framing mandated by US Supreme Court

by Carol Erskine, CommonWealth Beacon
May 7, 2026

BOSTON POLICE Officer Nicholas O’Malley has been charged with manslaughter in the fatal shooting of Stephenson King, a suspect in a reported carjacking in Roxbury in March. Officers located King less than a mile from the alleged carjacking. Police say he ignored commands and attempted to flee, maneuvering his vehicle and striking a police cruiser.

O’Malley fired three shots, later stating he believed his partner was about to be struck by the car King was driving. Suffolk District Attorney Kevin Hayden brought charges prior to seeking a grand jury indictment—an uncommon step in police shooting cases.

The district attorney’s explanation of the charge focuses on whether the officer’s perception of danger was reasonable and whether the shooting was justified, based largely on body-worn camera footage, witness accounts, and officer interviews. But that framing does not capture the full legal standard that governs police use of force.

Every police use-of-force case in this country is shaped by a Fourth Amendment constitutional framework established by the US Supreme Court in two pivotal decisions — Graham v. Connor, decided over 30 years ago, and Barnes v. Felix, handed down last year, which reaffirmed that decision. Those rulings will be central to the O’Malley case, and they cast the issue in a different light than the reporting so far has done.

Under the Constitution, the question is not whether the officer was ultimately right, nor whether prosecutors—viewing the evidence after the fact—disagree with his perception. The question is whether a reasonable officer, confronted with the same tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving circumstances, could have perceived an immediate threat and responded as Officer O’Malley did.

That standard allows for reasonable mistakes, so long as the officer’s perception and response were objectively reasonable.

In Graham, the court identified factors that must guide that analysis, including the severity of the suspected crime, whether the individual posed an immediate threat, whether there was active resistance, and whether the individual was attempting to evade arrest. Although the Graham case arose in a civil context, its definition of reasonableness applies in Massachusetts criminal cases through the doctrine of justification.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has made clear that juries must be instructed that a police officer is justified in using force that is “necessary and reasonable.” By requiring that instruction, Massachusetts courts have effectively adopted the Graham standard, ensuring that an officer’s actions are evaluated through the lens of a reasonable officer on the scene.

It is that constitutional standard—not 20/20 hindsight, which was rejected by Graham and Barnes—that must ultimately guide both the courtroom and the public understanding of this case.

While the district attorney frames this case through the lens of a state manslaughter charge, focusing on whether O’Malley’s conduct was “wanton or reckless,” that charge does not exist in a vacuum. It must pass through the uncompromising filter of the Fourth Amendment. In other words, the charge by the Commonwealth does not displace the governing constitutional standard of objective reasonableness to determine if O’Malley’s actions were justified, as he has asserted.

To overcome a claim of justification, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that the officer did not actually believe there was an immediate threat of death or serious bodily harm, or that any such belief—if honestly held—was not objectively reasonable.

In Barnes, the Supreme Court rejected a narrow focus on the precise “moment of threat,” emphasizing instead that courts must consider the totality of the circumstances, including events leading up to the use of force. As Justice Elena Kagan wrote, “A court deciding a use-of-force case cannot review the totality of the circumstances if it has put on chronological blinders.”

That broader context is critical here. According to public reporting, this encounter involved a violent carjacking, an attempted flight, ignored commands, and a collision with a police vehicle. If proven, those facts are central to the constitutional analysis of whether an officer could reasonably perceive an immediate threat.

Yet the district attorney’s public explanation gives little weight to one of the central factors required under Graham — the severity of the underlying crime. Carjacking, by definition, involves force or fear and is punishable by up to 15 years in prison. The reported assault of the victim in this case further underscores that severity. The DA’s emphasis on the fact that the suspect —in hindsight — was “unarmed” during the carjacking, risks minimizing a factor the Supreme Court has made clear must be part of the analysis.

By downplaying the carjacking, the suspect’s attempted flight, failure to comply with the officer’s commands, and crashing into the police cruiser in a rapidly evolving encounter, the district attorney’s comments appeared to bypass the very totality of circumstances that the Supreme Court has ruled must be the foundation of any use-of-force analysis.

To ignore the severity of the initial crime and these other factors is to put on the exact “chronological blinders” Justice Kagan warned against just last year.

Carol Erskine is a retired Massachusetts judge and college instructor teaching constitutional law.

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Carol Erskine, CommonWealth Beacon
May 7, 2026

BOSTON POLICE Officer Nicholas O’Malley has been charged with manslaughter in the fatal shooting of Stephenson King, a suspect in a reported carjacking in Roxbury in March. Officers located King less than a mile from the alleged carjacking. Police say he ignored commands and attempted to flee, maneuvering his vehicle and striking a police cruiser.

O’Malley fired three shots, later stating he believed his partner was about to be struck by the car King was driving. Suffolk District Attorney Kevin Hayden brought charges prior to seeking a grand jury indictment—an uncommon step in police shooting cases.

The district attorney’s explanation of the charge focuses on whether the officer’s perception of danger was reasonable and whether the shooting was justified, based largely on body-worn camera footage, witness accounts, and officer interviews. But that framing does not capture the full legal standard that governs police use of force.

Every police use-of-force case in this country is shaped by a Fourth Amendment constitutional framework established by the US Supreme Court in two pivotal decisions — Graham v. Connor, decided over 30 years ago, and Barnes v. Felix, handed down last year, which reaffirmed that decision. Those rulings will be central to the O’Malley case, and they cast the issue in a different light than the reporting so far has done.

Under the Constitution, the question is not whether the officer was ultimately right, nor whether prosecutors—viewing the evidence after the fact—disagree with his perception. The question is whether a reasonable officer, confronted with the same tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving circumstances, could have perceived an immediate threat and responded as Officer O’Malley did.

That standard allows for reasonable mistakes, so long as the officer’s perception and response were objectively reasonable.

In Graham, the court identified factors that must guide that analysis, including the severity of the suspected crime, whether the individual posed an immediate threat, whether there was active resistance, and whether the individual was attempting to evade arrest. Although the Graham case arose in a civil context, its definition of reasonableness applies in Massachusetts criminal cases through the doctrine of justification.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has made clear that juries must be instructed that a police officer is justified in using force that is “necessary and reasonable.” By requiring that instruction, Massachusetts courts have effectively adopted the Graham standard, ensuring that an officer’s actions are evaluated through the lens of a reasonable officer on the scene.

It is that constitutional standard—not 20/20 hindsight, which was rejected by Graham and Barnes—that must ultimately guide both the courtroom and the public understanding of this case.

While the district attorney frames this case through the lens of a state manslaughter charge, focusing on whether O’Malley’s conduct was “wanton or reckless,” that charge does not exist in a vacuum. It must pass through the uncompromising filter of the Fourth Amendment. In other words, the charge by the Commonwealth does not displace the governing constitutional standard of objective reasonableness to determine if O’Malley’s actions were justified, as he has asserted.

To overcome a claim of justification, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that the officer did not actually believe there was an immediate threat of death or serious bodily harm, or that any such belief—if honestly held—was not objectively reasonable.

In Barnes, the Supreme Court rejected a narrow focus on the precise “moment of threat,” emphasizing instead that courts must consider the totality of the circumstances, including events leading up to the use of force. As Justice Elena Kagan wrote, “A court deciding a use-of-force case cannot review the totality of the circumstances if it has put on chronological blinders.”

That broader context is critical here. According to public reporting, this encounter involved a violent carjacking, an attempted flight, ignored commands, and a collision with a police vehicle. If proven, those facts are central to the constitutional analysis of whether an officer could reasonably perceive an immediate threat.

Yet the district attorney’s public explanation gives little weight to one of the central factors required under Graham — the severity of the underlying crime. Carjacking, by definition, involves force or fear and is punishable by up to 15 years in prison. The reported assault of the victim in this case further underscores that severity. The DA’s emphasis on the fact that the suspect —in hindsight — was “unarmed” during the carjacking, risks minimizing a factor the Supreme Court has made clear must be part of the analysis.

By downplaying the carjacking, the suspect’s attempted flight, failure to comply with the officer’s commands, and crashing into the police cruiser in a rapidly evolving encounter, the district attorney’s comments appeared to bypass the very totality of circumstances that the Supreme Court has ruled must be the foundation of any use-of-force analysis.

To ignore the severity of the initial crime and these other factors is to put on the exact “chronological blinders” Justice Kagan warned against just last year.

Carol Erskine is a retired Massachusetts judge and college instructor teaching constitutional law.

This article first appeared on CommonWealth Beacon and is republished here under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

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