Myanmar — Justice Has a Court; The Powerful Have Veto Power

The Rohingya, Rare Earths, and the Extraordinary Business of Defending Human Rights Without Inconveniencing the Great Powers

“International justice has judges, treaties, and magnificent buildings. Refugees are still waiting to find out who holds the keys to their homes.”

I. THE COURT AND THE REFUGEE CAMP

The proposal to turn to the International Court of Justice to resolve the Rohingya tragedy seems admirable. It has everything needed to inspire enthusiasm among defenders of international law: judges, hearings, case files, lawyers, treaties, and a building truly worthy of civilization. Unfortunately, there is one small complication. The Rohingya do not live in the halls of The Hague. They live in refugee camps in Bangladesh, where families continue to wait for security, rights, and the conditions necessary to return to their homes. The distance between a judgment and a solution can be measured in miles, but also in decades of suffering.

The Court has already intervened. The Gambia filed a case against Myanmar in 2019 over alleged violations of the Genocide Convention. In January 2020, the ICJ ordered provisional measures to protect the Rohingya. In January 2026, public hearings on the merits of the case concluded. The proceedings represent an important legal effort; reducing them to a ceremony would be unfair. But recognizing their importance does not require pretending that a judicial decision, by itself, can restore a people’s homes.

II. THREE POWERS AND A SUBSOIL FAR TOO VALUABLE

Myanmar possesses substantial rare-earth deposits, particularly minerals used in electric vehicles, advanced technologies, energy systems, and military equipment. China is the principal destination for its heavy rare-earth exports and dominates much of their processing. That relationship involves companies, authorities, and armed organizations controlling different mining areas. It is worth remembering that the territory is not entirely under the control of a single government.

The United States has also shown interest in gaining access to these resources. In 2025, proposals examined by the Trump administration became known, and in October 2026, new contacts were reported between American representatives and authorities linked to Myanmar’s military leadership. Washington seeks to diversify its supplies of strategic minerals. An understandable industrial ambition, although a politically uncomfortable one when those resources are located in a country accused of extremely serious human rights violations.

Russia completes the picture. Moscow has maintained military cooperation with Myanmar for more than two decades, including supplies of weapons, aircraft, and military technology. It has also expanded its economic and strategic ties with the country. Its potential participation in projects involving natural resources represents another possibility within a relationship that deserves examination. It would not be rigorous to claim, without evidence, that Russia controls Myanmar’s rare earths. What can be established is that its strategic interests and military cooperation are part of this landscape.

III. THE EXTRAORDINARY RIGHT TO VETO

Here begins the most delicate part of the spectacle. The ICJ can issue binding decisions for the states involved, but it has no enforcement force of its own. When a country fails to comply with a judgment, the matter can be brought before the United Nations Security Council. There, five powers—the United States, China, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom—retain veto power over substantive decisions. This does not mean that all five have vetoed action concerning Myanmar, or that the Court takes orders from them. It means something equally troubling: the system allows political interests to determine how far an international response can go.

It is difficult to explain this arrangement to a family that has lost its home. First, they are promised that universal rights exist. Then they are told that a court must examine them. Finally, they discover that, if coercive international action becomes necessary, five governments possess special powers to block certain decisions. Everything perfectly regulated. Even powerlessness can be administered with impeccable formality.

CONCLUSION — CHILDREN CANNOT EAT COURT RULINGS

The Rohingya tragedy will not be resolved by denying the usefulness of courts or by placing responsibility exclusively on institutions when that responsibility also belongs to governments, international organizations, and armed actors. What is needed is justice, protection, verifiable conditions for a voluntary and safe return, and concrete accountability. Meanwhile, China, the United States, and Russia must be judged by their actual decisions, neither absolved nor condemned through slogans. The problem is not that great powers have economic interests; every country has them. The problem begins when those interests outweigh the protection of human beings who have spent years waiting to regain a dignified life.

“The great powers built a magnificent palace for international justice. They offered its doors to the victims, its chambers to the judges, and reserved for themselves the right to decide when to intervene. Then they gazed upon the refugee camps, delivered another speech about human dignity, and calmly returned to negotiating the riches beneath the ground.”

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. International Court of Justice (ICJ). The Gambia v. Myanmar.Application filed in 2019, provisional measures ordered in 2020, and hearings held in January 2026.

2. United Nations.Charter of the United Nations, Articles 27 and 94. Veto power in the Security Council and enforcement of ICJ judgments.

3. Reuters (2025). Myanmar Rebels Disrupt China Rare Earth Trade, Sparking Regional Scramble Investigation into Myanmar’s rare earths, China, and international interests.

4. Reuters (October 16, 2026).US Holds More Secret Talks with Myanmar’s Military-Backed Rulers in Tokyo. Investigation into American contacts with Myanmar and interest in its minerals.