Patrice Talon has now completed two terms in office, in line with Benin’s constitutional limit. As a result, he is expected to step down at the next election. But many suspect that he will seek to remain a political “backseat driver”, shaping the presidency from behind the scenes through allies and institutions he has carefully put in place for precisely that purpose.
That possibility matters not only for Benin, once widely seen as one of West Africa’s more democratic states, but also for a region already grappling with democratic backsliding, military coups, and rising insecurity. It is also especially timely. In a region where leaders have repeatedly manipulated constitutions, extended mandates, or simply refused to leave office, Benin should have offered a reassuring example of democratic restraint. Instead, the central question is no longer simply whether Talon will leave office, but whether alternation in office will amount to alternation in power.
The issue is thrown into sharp relief by the succession itself. The ruling party’s candidate, Romuald Wadagni, who is widely tipped to win, was personally handpicked by Talon. The other leading candidate, a polarising opposition figure, is also widely believed to be aligned with him. Whoever emerges victorious in the presidential election on April 12, Talon’s shadow is likely to loom large over the next administration.
The Authoritarian Drift and Clampdown on Political Pluralism
Over the past decade, a series of controversial political reforms introduced by the Talon administration have tilted the playing field decisively in favour of the ruling party coalition in every Beninese election. When parliamentary and municipal elections scheduled for January 2026 went ahead despite an attempted coup the previous month, this briefly appeared to signal the resilience of Benin’s constitutional order. But that more optimistic reading quickly faded when it became clear that the coalition led by the Talon administration had won every seat in the National Assembly, while opposition parties were not even allowed to compete in the municipal elections.
This gave further weight to an argument advanced by analysts in the wake of international condemnation of the attempted coup: that the real coup in Benin had, in many ways, already taken place under the Talon administration. Rather than a dramatic seizure of power, it has taken the form of a steady authoritarian drift that has emboldened intolerance of dissent, restricted freedoms of speech and expression, and raised formidable barriers to political pluralism.
Is Talon Really Leaving Power?
Whatever hope there was that Talon’s departure might signal democratic renewal has been clouded by his expected move to assume a seat in a Senate he ratified into existence in the National Assembly barely two weeks after the attempted coup. Packed with ex officio members, including former presidents of the republic, the National Assembly, and the Constitutional Court, and vested with powers that rival those of the presidency, this Senate raises troubling questions about where power in Benin will actually lie after 2026. It suggests that Talon may be leaving the presidency without truly leaving power.
In recent years, leaders determined to hold on to power have devised increasingly creative ways to circumvent constitutional term limits, often at considerable cost to political stability. The consequences have included gross human rights violations, the proliferation of coups, and the erosion of state institutions. Over the past decade, versions of this pattern have appeared in Guinea, Senegal, Togo, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Chad, and even in global powers such as Russia, posing serious challenges to sustainable governance.
Weaponizing Government Policy
Having taken office after two consecutive presidents who had both tried unsuccessfully to revise the Beninese constitution to extend their time in power, Talon initially promised to revise the two five-year presidential term limit with a single six-year term and to serve only once. Instead, he extended the terms of both the presidency and the National Assembly from five to seven years and concentrated loyalists and allies in key positions of power. He now plans to saddle the National Assembly with 25 ex officio members in perpetuity.
For a controversial leader who has accumulated executive authority, subdued the opposition, and clamped down ruthlessly on dissent, the immediate concern is not simply that the situation may deteriorate further. It is that it may remain much the same. Talon came to power as an independent candidate, but has since helped to construct a system in which independent challengers face ever greater barriers. What is at stake, then, is not only succession, but whether political closure is becoming institutionalised.
Ramifications for the Sub-region
At a time when regional integration in West Africa is already under severe strain, unease over Talon’s apparent designs reflects more than domestic concern. ECOWAS member states are struggling to navigate a region marked by democratic backsliding, military rule, and the widening divide created by the emergence of the Alliance of Sahel States. In that context, the prospect of another leader retaining power by indirect means is politically significant.
Part of the concern lies in the resemblance to developments elsewhere. In neighbouring Togo, Faure Gnassingbé has moved into the newly empowered role of president of the Council of Ministers after constitutional changes shifted executive authority away from the presidency. In Guinea-Bissau, Umaro Sissoco Embaló has also been accused of seeking to retain influence beyond conventional constitutional limits. Rather than openly abolishing term limits, incumbents are increasingly redesigning institutions so that power can outlive office.
Over the past decade, worsening diplomatic relations between Benin and some of its neighbours have already created significant barriers to economic and security cooperation, particularly as geopolitical tensions and competing regional alignments have intensified. At the same time, Benin faces rising insecurity and a growing terrorist threat. In this context, many citizens had hoped that regular civilian political turnover might help to ease tensions, strengthen dialogue, and improve regional cooperation. That prospect now appears far less certain.
The End of Democracy in Benin?
Public opinion suggests little appetite for authoritarian alternatives. According to recent findings in African Insights, Afrobarometer’s flagship report, 71 percent of Beninese reject military rule. A striking 91 percent reject one-party rule, while 90 percent reject one-man rule. These figures broadly reflect wider patterns across West Africa.
But public support for democracy is not always enough to protect it. Where leaders steadily reshape institutions to insulate themselves and their allies from competition, the result can be a system that retains democratic language while hollowing out democratic substance.
Talon has rejected calls to revisit his policies, arguing that they streamline Benin’s politics and place democracy “at the service of citizens and not at the exclusive service of political actors.” Yet the opposition has no representation in parliament. Each reform has further consolidated executive power. Political privilege remains concentrated within his immediate circle. The government has touted economic growth rates of up to 7.5 percent while suppressing protests over the rising cost of living.
Following repeated rulings against it for violating citizens’ rights, which it has routinely ignored, the government has revoked Beninese citizens’ ability to petition the ACHPR and the ECOWAS Court directly, with little consequence. More strikingly, ECOWAS election observation missions have commended elections conducted under the very reforms that helped to produce the current crisis.
Wadagni’s Destiny
As the technical architect of the Talon administration’s much-publicised economic transformation, Wadagni has outlined a vision for Benin centred on using the country’s balance sheet to drive more meaningful social change and ensure that recent economic gains are more widely felt.
Yet if he becomes president, his first challenge may be political rather than technocratic. The post-Talon era is unlikely to be stable. Instead, it may intensify rivalries within the ruling coalition, as its component parties seek to assert their independence and reposition themselves in a new balance of power.
It remains to be seen how he will navigate this moment. He may govern in the mould of his powerful patron, or, like other perceived protégés placed in similar situations – such as President Tshisekedi in the Democratic Republic of Congo – seek to carve out his own political identity and distance himself from his predecessor. Either path carries risks.
Whichever course he takes, the likely outcome is a period of tension, resistance, and prolonged consequences for governance and the economy. And that is perhaps the most frustrating feature of leaders’ determination to perpetuate themselves in power: it is ordinary citizens who bear the cost, often for years, even decades, to come.
David Kofi Asante-Darko is a research analyst with the West Africa Democracy Solidarity Network (WADEMOS) and the CDD Ghana.