[This is an excerpt from an article in The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs and Policy Studies.]
In the 2010s, the Commonwealth tried to stay relevant by focusing on big issues such as climate change, youth and technology. It gave its African members, especially small states, a platform, but its ability to deliver practical results was limited. When COVID-19 started in early 2020, it showed both the strengths and weaknesses of the Commonwealth in Africa (Nkengasong & Mankoula, Citation2020). At first, African governments were happy with what the Commonwealth Secretariat was saying. The Secretariat called for things that African members needed: fair access to vaccines, temporary relief from debt, and joint efforts to deal with the health crisis and the economic problems caused by the pandemic. The Commonwealth gave its African members moral and political support during COVID-19, but whether it could actually deliver on those promises was another question. Secretary-General Patricia Scotland issued a statement in March 2020 stressing the importance of ‘collective action and solidarity’, urging member states to work together to ensure that small and vulnerable countries were not left behind in global efforts to contain the virus (Commonwealth Secretariat, Citation2020a). From April 2020, the Commonwealth organised online meetings. These meetings brought together ministers of health, finance and education from different member countries. The goal was for them to share their experiences with COVID-19 and develop common strategies for handling the crisis. Policy briefs from Marlborough House sought to guide member states on issues ranging from public health protocols to the digitalisation of education and trade. Yet, in practice, the decisive structures that shaped Africa’s COVID-19 response lay elsewhere. The Commonwealth did not have much power when it came to securing vaccines for its African members. Instead, the African Union (AU) took the lead through its health agency, the Africa CDC. In November 2020, the AU created the African Vaccine Acquisition Task Team (AVATT). This group helped African countries join together to buy vaccines as a bloc instead of each country negotiating alone. The AU also set up the Africa Medical Supplies Platform, which allowed countries to buy medical tests and protective equipment in bulk at cheaper prices.
Similarly, other global partnerships were more important than the Commonwealth during the vaccine rollout. The COVAX facility, run by Gavi, the World Health Organisation (WHO), and CEPI, became the main system for sharing vaccines fairly around the world. In February 2021, Ghana made history as the first country anywhere to receive a delivery of vaccines from COVAX. It received 600,000 doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine, which was celebrated as a big step forward for global vaccine fairness (UNICEF, Citation2021). Nigeria, Kenya, Rwanda and other Commonwealth African members followed soon after, but these deliveries reflected the COVAX structure rather than Commonwealth coordination (UNICEF, Citation2021). Bilateral donations and partnerships also proved critical: India’s ‘Vaccine Maitri’ initiative supplied doses to countries including Mauritius and Seychelles in early 2021 (Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses [IDSA], Citation2021), while China provided millions of doses to Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Uganda through Sinopharm and Sinovac agreements (Sun, Citation2021). The Gulf states, notably the United Arab Emirates, also became significant partners in supplying medical aid and vaccines (Shubin, Citation2019).
On the economic side, the Commonwealth spoke up in support of debt relief for African countries, especially for small states that were struggling to pay their debts during COVID-19. In June 2020, the Commonwealth Secretariat called for the restructuring of debts. This message was in line with the G20’s Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), which aimed to give countries breathing space by postponing debt payments (Commonwealth Secretariat, Citation2020b). In reality, however, the real action came from the AU, IMF, the World Bank and others. The Commonwealth’s role was more about words than results. By the end of 2021, more than 30 African countries had joined the DSSI (IMF, Citation2021). Still, the progress was mostly because of global financial institutions, not because of Commonwealth lobbying. At the level of political symbolism, however, the Commonwealth’s interventions were not without value. The emphasis on small and vulnerable states resonated with African island members such as Seychelles and Mauritius, whose tourism-dependent economies were devastated by the collapse of global travel. The Commonwealth Secretariat’s reports gave attention to these countries’ problems in international meetings, making sure their voices were heard and not lost within the larger African story. Once again, the real financial help for Africa’s recovery did not come from the Commonwealth. Instead, it came from individual countries giving bilateral aid, from IMF emergency loans and from regional financial systems in Africa.
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By the time of the postponed Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), initially scheduled for Kigali in June 2020 but delayed because of the pandemic until 2022, it had become evident that while the Commonwealth could provide discursive solidarity and a platform for ministerial dialogue, its structural capacity to shape African members’ pandemic trajectory remained limited, and for African governments, the crisis reinforced a familiar lesson. While the Commonwealth retained symbolic importance, the heavy lifting of health security and economic recovery rested with continental institutions, global initiatives and bilateral partnerships.
By the mid-2020s, the Commonwealth continues to have symbolic importance in Africa, but its real influence is extremely limited. It still gives African leaders a stage to speak and be recognised, and it offers a framework for monitoring elections of the member states. It gives small African member states a voice on global issues such as climate change. Some countries have even returned as seen in the case of The Gambia, or joined as seen in the case of Mozambique, Gabon and Togo, showing that the Commonwealth still matters as a shared identity and diplomatic club, even if its power is limited. Yet, in terms of shaping Africa’s core political, security, or economic directions, its influence has been eclipsed by African regional organisations and by the continent’s diversified global partnerships.
Conclusion and policy implications
As outlined earlier, the Commonwealth’s self-conception as a values-based, facilitative association shapes both the possibilities and limits of its engagement with African member states. The arc of African members’ relationship with the Commonwealth from 1980 to 2025 tells a story of both continuity and change. Continuity lies in the enduring symbolic and normative value that African states attach to the organisation: as a forum for moral diplomacy in the fight against apartheid, as a platform for asserting democratic norms in the suspension of Nigeria and Zimbabwe, and as a badge of legitimacy for countries such as The Gambia and Rwanda seeking to consolidate or recalibrate their international standing. The Commonwealth’s convening power, its election observation missions and its advocacy for small and vulnerable states remain assets that African governments continue to draw upon. Change, however, has been more striking. Over the past four decades, the Commonwealth’s influence in Africa has steadily shifted from centre stage to the margins of international engagement. The rise of the African Union and ECOWAS as primary vehicles for peace and security, the consolidation of NEPAD and the African Peer Review Mechanism as continental governance tools, and the intensification of Africa’s ties with China, India, the Gulf states and the European Union have reduced the Commonwealth’s structural relevance. The crisis over Zimbabwe revealed the limits of its enforcement mechanisms,Footnote1 while the experience of Brexit demonstrated that Commonwealth ties, however rhetorically celebrated, cannot substitute for hard economic arrangements.
For African policymakers, instead of expecting the Commonwealth to deliver transformative economic or security outcomes, African governments should focus on the areas where the Commonwealth retains comparative advantage. The organisation has done very well in the area of amplifying the voices of small states in global debates on climate change, providing technical and electoral support, and promoting soft-power networks in education, youth and cultural diplomacy. It is advisable that African policymakers focus on these functions. These functions may not command headlines, but they contribute to the incremental strengthening of African states within the international system.
African leaders should also adopt a reform-oriented posture towards the Commonwealth itself. For if the organisation is to remain relevant in the 21st century, African states, which make up nearly one-third of its membership, must press for reforms that enhance accountability, resource mobilisation and policy coherence. This could mean asking for development money that is better targeted, giving the Commonwealth Secretariat more strength and resources, or making sure that after elections are observed, there are real actions to improve things. In this way, Africa is not just receiving what the Commonwealth offers; it will also play an active role in shaping and improving the organisation itself.
From 1980 to 2025, the Commonwealth’s place in Africa is best described as more symbolic than practical. It has given African leaders a platform to speak. It has added moral support to major struggles such as the fight against apartheid, and provided legitimacy to countries going through political change, as seen in the case of Nigeria, Kenya and The Gambia. But over the years, its influence has been overshadowed by stronger regional bodies and global powers, and how much impact the Commonwealth will have on the African continent in the future will depend on whether African governments choose to use it as a real tool, rather than simply holding onto it for history’s sake. Today, the Commonwealth is not a central force in African diplomatic calculus, but its future relevance on the continent will rest on whether it can adjust to its African members’ urgent development needs in an international system where power is shared by many players.
Stephen Adewale, Department of History, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria.
